The Gaza Strip speech by Golda Meir

I rise to make a statement on the problems of the Sinai Desert, the Gulf¹ of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip.,On 3 December 1956 Israeli forces withdrew from the Suez Canal area along the length of the Canal to a distance of some 50 kilometres. This action enabled the United Nations Emergency Force to take up its position for the first time along the Suez Canal, and to create conditions in which the work of clearance² might begin. The Secretary-General in his discussions with Israel representatives had indicated that the clearing of the Suez Canal was the most urgent and immediate³ problem, after which one could deal with the general problem of withdrawal⁴ in the Sinai Desert and finally with the particular problem of the Sharm el-Sheikh area.,Subsequent phases of withdrawal carried out during December and January followed this scheme of priorities.,On 8 January 1957 Israeli forces withdrew to a more easterly line, leaving no Israeli forces west of El Arish. As a result of this action, the major part of the Sinai Desert was evacuated⁵. Thus the undertaking⁶ of the Israel Government transmitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on 24 December had been precisely⁷ fulfilled.,On 8 January, as soon as the previous phase of withdrawal had been completed, the Israel Government informed the Secretary-General of its decision to withdraw another 25 to 30 kilometers throughout the Sinai Desert except in the area of Sharm el-Sheikh. This action enabled the entry of United Nations Emergency Forces into El Arish and the St. Catherine's Monastery⁸.,On 14 January, one day before the previous phase of withdrawal was due for completion, the Israel Government communicated its decision to have the Sinai Desert entirely⁹ evacuated by Israel forces on 22 January with the exception of the Sharm el-Sheikh area; that is the strip on the west coast of the Gulf of Aqaba which at present ensures freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba. At the same time my Government informed the Secretary-General of its willingness to enter forthwith into conversations with him in connection with the evacuation of this strip. At the meeting of 14 January the Israel representative also indicated the desire of my Government to begin discussions at an early date on the arrangements envisaged¹⁰ for the Gaza area.,From this narrative¹² the General Assembly will observe that the withdrawals¹³ in the Sinai Desert have followed an orderly system of phasing, in coordination¹⁴ with the eastward¹⁵ movement of United Nations Emergency Forces following closely behind. By 22 January Israel will have evacuated approximately 30,000 sq. miles of territory which it had held at the end of November, when the United Nations Emergency Force first became capable of following up the Israeli withdrawals in force as envisaged in the General Assembly's resolution of 7 November.,It is evident, therefore, that my Government cannot accept--nor can any objective mind sustain--any criticism of Israel's action in carrying out its undertaking of 8 November "to withdraw its forces from Egyptian territory as soon as satisfactory arrangements can be made with the United Nations in connection with the United Nations Emergency Force.",On the basis of the discussions which its representatives have had during this phased withdrawal, my Government understands that there will not be any joint¹⁶ occupation in the area between Egyptian forces and UNEF forces; we believe that it should be the policy of the United Nations to maintain separation between Egyptian and Israeli forces.,Before I discuss the complex problems which now confront us I wish to comment on the circumstances which have attended these efforts by Israel to fulfil the objectives of the General Assembly. The position can be briefly¹⁷ stated. Throughout these weeks during which Israel has co-operated actively¹⁸ with the United Nations on the withdrawal of troops, there has not been one single act of compliance¹⁹ by Egypt with the recommendations or policies of the international organisation²⁰, to which she has looked for protection against the consequences of her own belligerency.,While the General Assembly's resolution of 2 November established special priority for an immediate cease-fire, it also contained other recommendations, not one of which the Egyptian Government has shown any intention to fulfil.,The 2 November resolution urged that "upon the cease-fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation." This objective, so vital for the security and economic welfare of many countries, has been subjected by Egypt to every kind of obstruction²¹ and delay; conditions and provisos have been attached to every phase of its implementation²³. No action has been spared which might slow the process down; steps essential for the clearance of the Canal have been made conditional²⁴ on the policies and preferences of the territorial²⁵ power. Negotiations²⁶ aiming at establishing international law in the operation of the Suez Canal have been delayed, at Egypt's behest. Above all, the Egyptian Government has given no indication that when the Canal is open it will not again be exposed to the illegality and discrimination which Egypt has maintained for the past six years, in defiance²⁸ of a decision by the Security Council.,A similar fate has befallen the injunction of the General Assembly in its 2 November resolution "to desist from raids across the armistice²⁹ lines in the neighbouring territory." Fedayeen gangs, operating in neighbouring countries under Egyptian direction, continue to spread death and havoc³¹ throughout our countryside. Since 3 December when the Cairo radio announced the intention of the Nasser regime to conduct raids into Israel throughout the winter, some 30 assaults have been committed. The official media of information in Egypt have reported these attacks in boastful communiqués. It is evident that in this respect, too, Egypt claims the fulfilment of Assembly resolutions by others, without any parallel acts of compliance on her part.,Moreover, during a period in which the United Nations has used its full influence on Egypt's behalf for the withdrawal of troops, Egyptian policy has been masked by a grave violation³² of Charter principles and of fundamental human rights. Foreign nationals have been expropriated and deported³³. The Jewish community has been subjected to a persecution³⁴ recalling some of the excesses of totalitarianism before and during the Second World War. 7,000 Egyptian Jews have been driven out by this organised cruelty, and all the conditions for a panic-stricken exodus³⁶ have been wilfully³⁷ created by the Nasser regime. Thousands of victims have reached Israel's welcoming shores. Some member Governments, in their direct relationships with Egypt, have been moved to express mounting indignation and concern.,World opinion has been quick to perceive the disparity between the assistance which Egypt has received of the United Nations, and the complete absence of any Egyptian response to the legitimate³⁹ interests of other States and of the organised international community. The question whether Israel is not withdrawing into a position of exposure to renewed Egyptian belligerency, by land and sea, arises in our mind with increasing anxiety and concern.,The acuteness of this question will be easily perceived if we recall that twelve weeks have elapsed since my Government addressed four questions to the Egyptian Government which have still not been answered:,1. Does Egypt still adhere to the position declared and maintained by her over years that she is in a state of war with Israel?,2. Is Egypt prepared to enter into immediate negotiations with Israel with a view to the establishment of peace between the two countries as indicated in paragraph 3 of the aide-memoire of the Government of Israel of 4 November 1956 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations?,3. Does Egypt agree to cease economic boycott⁴⁰ against Israel and lift the blockade of Israel shipping⁴¹ in the Suez Canal?,4. Does Egypt undertake to recall Fedayeen gangs under her control in other Arab countries?,In our talks with the Secretary-General on withdrawal it was mutually understood at all times that the Sharm el Sheikh and Gaza areas were reserved for discussions at a later stage in the withdrawal process. Thus, if the reservation of these problems to this later stage were now made a source of criticism or blame, a serious injustice⁴² would be incurred⁴³, to the grave prejudice of future discussions. These problems are of special complexity⁴⁴; they touch the question of Israel's security at its most sensitive point. They cannot be treated lightly, without danger to international peace and security. In each case, a change in the existing situation without simultaneous measures to prevent the renewal⁴⁵ of belligerency would lead to a possibility, nay⁴⁶, even a certainty, of tension and hostility⁴⁷.,I now come to explain why these problems have this special character, and why we must all work with care and precision at the stage which we have now reached in our deliberations.,The Straits of Tiran,The strip of territory in the Sharm el Sheikh area commands the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba through the Straits of Tiran. The only channel leading from the Red Sea to the Gulf passes between the Island of Tiran and the southeast extremity⁴⁸ of the Sinai coast.,This channel is three miles in width, but its navigable part is only some 500 metres broad. Thus any ship passing to or from the Gulf of Aqaba must come very close to the Sinai coast.,At a point in the Sharm el Sheikh area known as Ras Nasrani, Egypt set up gun emplacements six years ago for the sole purpose of preventing ships from sailing freely in the Gulf of Aqaba to and from the port of Elath. Two of these were 6-inch guns and four 3-inch guns. They were trained on the only lane usable by ships as they sail through the Straits. These guns have blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba for the past six years.,Sharm el Sheikh, Ras Nasrani and the neighbouring islands are uninhabited, waterless and desolate⁴⁹. The only purpose of any human presence in those places until 3 November was to prevent free access to an international waterway. The purpose of our presence since then has been to ensure free access. It is astonishing to observe the elaborate installations; the ammunition⁵⁰ depots⁵¹; the airstrip; the spacious⁵² accommodations which the Egyptians had established, with the sole aim of obstructing⁵³ the free passage of commerce between two parts of the high seas.,These installations were established towards the end of 1949. In reply to a query⁵⁴ addressed to it by the American Embassy in Cairo, the Egyptian Government, on 28 January 1950, gave assurances that it had no intention of interfering⁵⁵ with peaceful shipping, and that passage through the Straits would "as in the past remain free in conformity⁵⁶ with international practice and with recognised principles of international law." This Egyptian document has been recorded in full in the verbatim records of the Security Council,In spite of this assurance, and of the fact that the Gulf of Aqaba is a recognised waterway, Egypt has used its gun emplacements to blockade the passage of ships bound for Elath through the Straits of Tiran. The blockade in the Suez Canal, which was condemned⁵⁷ by the Security Council in 1951, has been carried out by Egypt with equal stringency--and illegality--in the Gulf of Aqaba.,The blockade works primarily through its deterrent⁵⁹ effect, but many acts of force have been committed against ships exercising innocent passage in this international waterway. Fire has been opened on British, American and Italian ships; interference and obstruction have been offered to vessels⁶⁰ of Norwegian, Danish and other flags. These acts of piracy⁶¹ had almost eliminated commerce and navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba; slowed down the development of the Port of Elath; inflicted⁶² illicit⁶³ injury on Israel's economy and trade, and denied other countries an alternative route to the Suez Canal, as a link between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean⁶⁴.,On 3 November, when Israel forces entered the Sharm el Sheikh area to assure Israel's self-defence against wanton belligerency, these guns were silenced. To-day, for the first time, ships of all nations are free to move north and south through the Straits of Tiran to and from Elath. An alternative link to Suez joining the Red Sea and Mediterranean is now open to all shipping without distinction of flag.,In his Note to the General Assembly the Secretary-General refers to "the international significance of the Gulf of Aqaba" which justifies⁶⁵ "the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf in accordance with rules of international law." In 1949 the International Court of Justice ruled that when straits are geographically⁶⁶ part of a highway used for international navigation, the vessels of all nations enjoy the right of free passage therein, whether or not the straits are entirely or partly within the territorial waters of one or more states. In the words of the Court, they belong to the class of international highways through which passage cannot be prohibited by a coastal⁶⁸ state.,The international character of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran is fully³⁸ confirmed by the jurisprudence of the United Nations. In 1951, the Security Council denounced the Egyptian blockade against Israel, as inconsistent with Egypt's international obligations. In particular, the Security Council denied Egypt the right to exercise visit, search or seizure⁶⁹ or to apply restrictions⁷⁰ against shipping on the grounds of "belligerent⁷¹ rights". Egypt was called upon to cease all such practices. While the Council's decision was prompted by the Egyptian illegalities in the Suez Canal, its judgments⁷² against visit, search or seizure are couched in broader terms, so as to be of general application.,In March 1954 the Security Council discussed an Israeli complaint against Egyptian restrictions both in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. The majority voted for a resolution condemning⁷³ these restrictions, wherever applied⁷⁴, and calling for their immediate cessation. This resolution was presented by New Zealand and supported by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Brazil, Colombia, Turkey and Denmark. Interpreting the majority view, the New Zealand representative said: